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Abstract
The ruling from the arbitral tribunal dealing
with the case between China and the
Philippines in the South China Sea provides
opportunities for fresh approaches to building
cooperation for managing the sea and
activities within it. This cooperation is both a
necessity and an obligation of the countries
bordering the sea. However, obstacles remain,
particularly the lack of trust between the
various stakeholders in the sea and the way
in which important areas for cooperation, such
as fisheries management, environmental
protection and marine scientific research, have
been politicised to the extent that even
cooperation in these areas cannot proceed
without greater strategic trust. The objective
of this paper is to put forward a set of policy
implications from the ruling that might
overcome these obstacles and allow the
necessary cooperation to proceed despite the
lack of strategic trust.
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1. Introduction
The arbitral tribunal established under the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) to deal with the dispute
between China and the Philippines in the South
China Sea produced its final ruling in July
2016 (PCA 2016). Despite frequent references
to the ruling as being from the Permanent
Court of Arbitration in The Hague, this is not
so. Rather, it was a ruling from a tribunal
established under Annex VII of the 1982
UNCLOS for dispute resolution. The
Permanent Court of Arbitration only provided
secretarial and media support for the tribunal.
The ruling has been described both as a
‘game changer’ (Beckman 2016) and ‘a
stinging blow to China’s international prestige’
(Rosen 2016). However, as time goes by, it
seems the impact of the ruling will be less than
anticipated. It will remain of legal interest
because of the criteria it established for
determining whether offshore features are
‘islands’ or ‘rocks’. In this regard, the ruling
went beyond what many international legal
experts were expecting. But even this impact
will be prospective rather than retrospective—
countries, including Australia and Japan, that
have claimed exclusive economic zones
(EEZs) from features, which may not be ‘fully
entitled’ islands under the criteria used by the
tribunal, will not be changing their claims
(Bateman 2016a).
On the credit side, the ruling provides
opportunities, including a basis for
negotiations between the parties involved
(Xie 2016) and a return to a more cooperative
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path for managing the South China Sea and
activities within it. Constructive dialogue is
now required rather than destructive sniping.
As the editors of the East Asia Forum have
rightly pointed out, ‘It is not a time for
grandstanding, adding insult to injury or taking
action that could be construed as provocative’
(Editors, EAF 2016). This paper reviews the
impact of the ruling on regional affairs and
identifies some policy implications.
2. Regional Responses
Only seven countries have formally called for
the award to be respected—Australia,
Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines,
United States and Vietnam (CSIS 2016). With
the exception of the Philippines and Vietnam,
Southeast Asian countries have ‘sat on the
fence’. Vietnam benefits from the ruling
because it supports the country’s exclusive
sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the
extensive EEZ generated from its lengthy
mainland coast (Kraska 2016). After initially
welcoming the ruling, the Philippines under
President Duterte has opened up negotiations
between Manila and Beijing to explore several
cooperative initiatives (Song 2016). The
Philippines’ foreign policy shift has changed
the discourse over the South China Sea and
may reduce regional tensions over disruptive
issues (Chan 2016).
The United States and Japan have pressed
regional countries to make strong statements
about the ruling (Ko & Puy 2016). However,
recent regional forums have not mentioned it
in their closing statements (Reuters 2016). The
chairman’s statement from the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in
Vientiane in September 2016 ‘emphasised the
importance of non-militarisation and self-
restraint in theconductofallactivities, including
land reclamation that could further complicate
the situation and escalate tensions in the South
China Sea’, but did not mention the ruling
(ASEAN 2016). This lack of reference to the
ruling suggests the influence that China enjoys
within the region. It also suggests that while
Southeast Asian countries want the United
States to remain in the region as a balance to
China, they are rather less supportive of more
challenging moves byWashington.
3. Consequences
There are numerous consequences of the ruling
(Rothwell 2016). By denying the legal basis of
China’s nine-dashed line under UNCLOS, it
negated China’s claim to maritime rights over
much of the South China Sea and provided
support for the littoral countries to exercise
sovereign rights over resources in their EEZs.
The importance the tribunal attached to EEZ
jurisdiction may reinforce the nationalistic
attitude the littoral states attach to their EEZs.
This attitude will not help the development of
effective cooperation for managing the South
China Sea.
The judgement that there are no ‘fully
entitled’ islands in the Spratly group was a
surprising feature of the ruling. Theoretically,
this provides a basis for a system of EEZ
boundaries in the South China Sea with a
number of enclaved territorial seas around the
‘rocks’. There may even be patches of high
seas, although these may be closed off in part
by the outer continental shelf claims by
Vietnam and Malaysia in 2009 that served to
aggravate already complex disputes (Schofield
& Storey 2009, pp. 13–16). Vietnam could
also help ‘clear the air’ and demonstrate
ASEAN solidarity, by dropping its claim to
features within the EEZs of Malaysia and the
Philippines. Elsewhere in the South China
Sea, islands in both the Paracel and Pratas
groups are much larger than those in the
Spratlys and could be ‘fully entitled’ islands,
but maritime boundaries near the Paracels
cannot be defined while their sovereignty is
disputed between China and Vietnam.
The countries bordering the South China
Sea are looking for ‘fences in the sea’ rather
than recognising that maritime boundaries are
not an end in themselves but rather a means
of effectively managing maritime space. Due
mainly to the geography of the sea, negotiating
its maritime boundaries is always going to be
difficult (Bateman 2016b). Rather than
maritime boundaries per se, effective maritime
management should be the basic objective of
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the bordering countries. It is also their
obligation under UNCLOS. All these countries
are parties to UNCLOS,1 and thus have an
obligation under part IX of that convention
dealing with ‘enclosed or semi-enclosed
seas’ to cooperate on managing the sea. The
words ‘should co-operate’ and ‘shall
endeavour’ in Article 123 of UNCLOS place
a strong obligation on the littoral states to co-
ordinate their activities with living resource
management, protecting the marine
environment and marine scientific research.
Furthermore, the opening sentence of Article
123 creates a more general obligation for
them to cooperate ‘with each other in the
exercise of their rights and in the performance
of their duties under this Convention’. This
obligation could be interpreted to include the
maintenance of law and order at sea (CSCAP
2008, p. 2).
Thenecessity tocooperate in theSouthChina
Sea flows from factors such as increasing
shipping traffic, pressures on marine resources
(both living and non-living), environmental
degradations and the need to avoid a ‘tragedy
of the commons’ (a ‘lose-lose’ outcome).
Reports have shown that over 60 per cent of
the coral reefs in Southeast Asia, largely in the
South China Sea, are either effectively lost or
in a critical state of degradation (Wilkinson
2008, p. 11). Most fish stocks in the sea,
according to a 2012 report from the United
Nations Food and Agricultural Organization
(FAO) are either fully exploited or over-
exploited, particularly in the western part of the
sea (FAO 2012, p. 59). Effective management
of the marine environment and sustainable
development of living resources depends on
good marine scientific research, but even that
is being frustrated by current levels of distrust.
The ruling from the arbitral tribunal now
provides opportunities to go back to basics
and start with ‘a clean sheet of paper’ with
managing the situation in the South China
Sea. Opportunities exist for negotiations
between the parties involved (Xie 2016) and
building functional cooperation. The focus of
negotiations should now be on functional
cooperation for activities, such as marine
scientific research, fisheries management,
protecting and preserving the marine
environment, maritime law enforcement, and
search and rescue (SAR) (Bateman 2016a).
4. Obstacles to Cooperation
Despite the obligations and need for
cooperation in the South China Sea, effective
cooperation faces major obstacles. First, there
is the reality that much current commentary
on the South China Sea follows the realist
theory of international relations that states
largely act in their own self-interest.2 Under
this theory, states compete against each other
to achieve their own interests rather than
recognising the possibility of a ‘win-win’
outcome achieved through cooperation.
Conversely, liberal thinking in international
relations allows for states sharing some
concept of the common good and avoiding a
‘tragedy of the commons’; in short, the realist
approach inhibits cooperation while a liberal
approach encourages it.
A second major factor is the lack of trust.
Trust (or the belief that the other side ‘will do
what is right’) is a key consideration (Hoffman
2002). However, trust is a difficult concept that
means different things to different people and
in different contexts. This is evident in the
question as to what comes first between trust
and cooperation. Cooperation to deal with
‘softer’ issues, such as SAR, fisheries
management, marine scientific research and
marine environmental protection, should help
build trust, but as has been noted, a prevalent
regional view is that even this cooperation
cannot proceed without strategic trust.
The issue of trust cuts across all processes of
cooperation and confidence building. Some
forms of cooperation, such as counter-piracy
and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
(HADR), are successful, but these activities
are common interests of regional countries.
1. Cambodia is the only Southeast Asian country not a
party to United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
2. For example, most papers in the Special Focus edition
of Contemporary Southeast Asia, dealing with the South
China Sea vol. 33, no. 3, December 2011.
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They are ‘low-hanging fruit’ that do not require
the identification, even by implication, of
another state as a competitor.3 A benefit of
HADR operations and exercises is that these
activities provide opportunities for regional
defence forces, including those of China and
the United States, to work together with
common purpose (Johnson 2015).
Provocative actions and statements only
serve to add to distrust and frustrate
cooperation. Commencing with the Vietnam–
Malaysia joint submission for an extended
continental shelf in the South China Sea
(Bateman & Schofield 2009), the American
‘pivot’ to Asia and the Philippines launching
its arbitration case against China, recent years
have seen an escalating spiral of provocation
and counter-provocation that has led to
increased strategic distrust between China and
the United States, between China and ASEAN
and even within ASEAN. Rather than
cooperation on softer ‘S’ security issues, such
as fisheries management and marine
environmental management, being seen as
confidence-building measures, there is now a
belief that even these forms of cooperation
are not possible without trust.
A second obstacle is related to the lack of
trust. This is the way in which ‘softer’ issues
ofmaritimecooperation havebeen ‘securitized’
as non-traditional security issues. This
securitization contributes to the ‘politicisation’
of maritime cooperation, even for activities that
are obligations of the littoral countries. This
restrictive security approach leads to distrust
and is a large part of the reasonwhy cooperation
for SARand evenmarine scientific research has
failed to gain momentum, let alone cooperation
for the potentially more sensitive issues of oil
and gas exploration and fisheries management.
TheUnitedNations Environment Programme/
Global Environment Facility South China Sea
project, ‘Reversing Environmental Degradation
in the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand’ is
an example of this process of ‘politicisation’. This
project ran from 2002 to 2008 in Cambodia,
China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
Thailand and Vietnam (Vo & Pernetta 2010). It
focused on the priority areas of the loss and
degradation of coastal habitats, over-exploitation
of fisheries and land-based marine pollution. It
achieved some good outcomes, particularly by
fostering cooperation among the scientists of
participating countries, but increased political
tensions prevented themomentumof cooperation
from being sustained. One lesson learnt was the
importance of separating ‘the scientific and
technical from the policy and decision-making
to allow for a better integration of scientific and
technical data into the decision-making process
than would be possible with a single, joint forum
that could have resulted in confusion between the
purely scientific and technical on the one hand,
and the policy related issues and concerns on
the other’ (Vo & Pernetta 2010, p. 592). Or put
more simply, politics should be kept out of the
science.
The third factor is the focus of littoral
countries on independence and sovereignty.
They are reluctant to engage in cooperative
activities because that may compromise
sovereignty claims and national independence.
This is often despite enthusiastic rhetoric about
the cooperative ideal. Perceptions that
cooperation implies some concession on
sovereignty claims and fears of domination by
the larger partners in a cooperative framework
are significant obstacles to cooperation.
Cooperative initiatives should be based on the
clear understanding that cooperation is without
prejudice to sovereignty claims.
A last obstacle is that cooperation can also
involve financial costs above and beyond what
it costs to manage maritime interests
independently. Much time and effort can be
expended in reconciling one’s own interests
with those of other parties, and countries will
make a simple cost-benefit analysis of whether
cooperation is worthwhile. They will not
engage in cooperation if they perceive the costs
exceed the benefits.
5. Promoting Cooperation
Since 1990, Indonesia has hosted a series of
informal workshops on managing potential
3. While this might also appear to be the case with search
and rescue, sovereignty disputes also impact on the
designation of search and rescue areas of responsibility.
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conflicts in the South China Sea with the last
workshop held in Bandung in November 2016
(Salim2016).Themaingoalof theseworkshops
is not to solve the sovereignty disputes in the
South China Sea but to develop a sense of
‘community’ in the South China Sea area that
reflected the spirit of cooperation in UNCLOS,
especially through the semi-enclosed seas
concept in part IX (Djalal 2009). In addition to
annual workshops, the process has included
technical working groups and groups of experts
meetings on issues in particular areas of
cooperation, including marine scientific
research, marine environmental protection,
resource assessment and development, and
legal matters. The process has achieved
agreement for some cooperative initiatives in
these areas (Townsend-Gault 2009, p. 196),
but due to lack of funding, there has been little
follow through on these initiatives, and the
workshop process has made uneven progress.
In the recent years, China has taken a lead
with initiating cooperation in the South China
Sea. It launched the ASEAN-China Maritime
Cooperation Fund with a budget of $500
million in 2011 (Hayton 2016). This provided
for the establishment of expert committees on
marine scientific research, environmental
protection, search and rescue and transnational
crime, and other bilateral arrangements with
Southeast Asian countries including a planned
China-ASEAN Ocean College. Then at the
Boao Forum in 2016, China announced the
establishment of the China-Southeast Asia
Research Centre for the South China Sea to
conduct and coordinate research on resources,
the marine environment and so on (Chen
2016). However, these initiatives have made
little progress due mainly to the lack of trust
among regional countries about China’s
motives. They appear to believe that greater
trust is required before there can be
cooperation. As one researcher has observed,
‘Scientific cooperation hasn’t reduced mistrust,
and common interests don’t prevail’ (Boisseau
du Rocher 2015, p. 8).
UNCLOS Article 123(d) provides that the
bordering states to the South China Sea may
invite ‘other interested states or international
organizations’ to participate in fulfilling
their obligations to cooperate. With the
exception of the United Nations Environment
Programme/Global Environment Facility
South China Sea project, there has been little
or no effort to implement this article despite it
providing an avenue for other countries and
international organisations to contribute
expertise to assist effective management of
the South China Sea, particularly with the
management of fish stocks and marine
environmental protection. Rather than
contemplating further military operations in
the South China Sea, ‘interested states’, such
as Australia, Japan and the United States, could
be bringing ‘carrots’ rather than ‘sticks’ to the
South China Sea by offering up their maritime
expertise. Because of their extensive maritime
interests, they all have extensive expertise in
relevant fields.
A consensus on the South China Sea issue
may be emerging between China and ASEAN
(Ngeow 2016). The removal of this divisive
issue from the ASEAN agenda will allow the
association to focus back on closer regional
cooperation with scope for a ‘dual-track’
approach to the management of the South
China Sea—the current track focused on a
binding Code of Conduct (COC) plus a parallel
track focused on cooperation for managing the
sea and activities within it. The latter might be
based on the current initiatives by China
through the ASEAN-China Maritime
Cooperation Fund.
A cooperative management regime is the
only means of managing the South China Sea
and activities within it. This will only be
achieved when the bordering countries change
their mindsets from one of sovereignty, sole
ownership of resources and seeking ‘fences in
the sea’ to one of functional cooperation and
cooperative management (Bateman 2016b).
An acceptable framework for a new regime
would be a web of provisional arrangements
covering cooperation for different functions
with perhaps even different areas for each
function. These functions could include joint
management of oil and gas resources, fisheries,
SAR, marine scientific research, good order at
sea and protection of the marine environment.
Regardless of whether or not maritime
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boundaries are agreed, urgent safety, resource
and environmental problems dictate the need
for increased dialogue and cooperation.
6. Way Ahead
Theconcludingpartof thispaperconsiderswhat
might be performed to promote cooperation to
ease tensions in the South China Sea. Major
needs include greater trust and more effective
management of regional maritime concerns.
Current negotiations on the South China Sea
occur mainly through regular Senior Officials’
Meetings (SOM) and Joint Working Group
Meetings on the Implementation of the
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea. The last of these meetings
were held in August 2016 with the parties once
again reaffirming ‘their commitment toproperly
managing differences, increasing mutual trust
and removing disturbances so as to make the
South China Sea a sea of peace, friendship and
cooperation’ (MFA PRC 2016). Despite this
lofty ideal, progress towards a binding COC
remains slow with grounds for caution about
any illusions of progress towards it
(Parameswaran 2016).
The cooperation track might be progressed
by disconnecting essential civil maritime
cooperation on non-traditional security issues
from the more traditional security concerns
reflected in the sovereignty disputes and the
search for a binding COC. These are the root
causes of distrust. Desecuritizing civil
maritime cooperation, largely covering the
forms of cooperation that are both an
obligation and a necessity, might allow it to
proceed even without political trust.
Trust might be considered at different levels.
While strategic distrust is the most serious
problem, operational distrust restricts the
cooperation necessary to deal with issues, such
as marine pollution, SAR and fisheries.
Operational trust is currently conflated with
strategic trust, the lack of which has become
the main obstacle to effective maritime
cooperation.
It may be possible to build operational trust
without strategic trust. A fixation on resolving
sovereignty claims reinforces distrust and
inhibits cooperation, whereas cooperative
activities on ‘softer’ issues could help build
operational trust even though strategic trust is
absent. A strong South China Sea forum, based
on the existing SOM but bringing together
officials from functional departments (e.g.
fisheries, environment and shipping) rather
than foreign ministries, might be established
to promote civil maritime cooperation for tasks
such as law enforcement, SAR and marine
environmental protection. A recent positive
development in this regard is the proposal
initiated by the ASEAN Maritime Forum for
the establishment of an ASEAN Coast Guard
Forum (ASEAN 2015). If China was also
invited to participate in ASEAN Coast Guard
Forum meetings, it could become a useful
vehicle to provide good order in the South
China Sea without being bogged down by
strategic distrust.
7. Policy Implications
China and ASEAN should now be given space
to work out their differences and explore
cooperation for managing the South China
Sea without pressure or provocation from
extra-regional/non-littoral powers. There is no
strategic imperative for these powers to take
any action, including no extant threat to
freedoms of navigation and overflight that
warrant confrontational assertions of these
freedoms. Dialogue between ASEAN and
China should now be given the chance towork.
Policy implications include the following:
• A Track 1 Forum, possibly based on the
existing SOM, should be established to
manage maritime cooperation in the South
China Sea.
• Negotiations should focus on functional
cooperation for activities, such as marine
scientific research, fisheries management,
protecting and preserving the marine
environment, maritime law enforcement
and SAR.4
4. These were areas for cooperation identified in the 2002
Declaration on the Conduct.
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• Cooperative initiatives should be based on
the clear understanding that cooperation is
without prejudice to sovereignty claims.
• Regional forums should continue to promote
counter-piracy and HADR operations and
exercises.
• Epistemic communities of marine scientists,
marine environmental experts and fisheries
managers should be given the freedom to
conduct their business without political
interference.
• The bordering countries to the South China
Sea might invite other interested states and
international organisations to provide
expertise in managing the South China Sea
and activities within it.
• An ASEAN-China Coast Guard Forum
might be established to help promote
operational trust in the South China Sea.
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